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ABSTRACT 
In the beginning, they were one. As the social division of labour accelerated and knowledge 
advanced, philosophy and science diverged further and further from each other, bringing us to 
the situation today. All disciplines proliferate into sub-disciplines of sub-disciplines. We know 
more and more about less and less. Who sees the whole picture? The lecture will sketch the 
historical trajectory of intellectual specialisation, its advantages and its disadvantages. It will 
focus particularly on the need of science for philosophy and the consequences of lack of 
philosophical grounding for science. 
 
In the beginning, they were one. Science and philosophy were the same process. Scientia means 
knowledge. Philosophia is love of wisdom. In our western tradition, we trace the history of 
science and the history of philosophy to the same sources. Philosophy was once all knowledge.  
Even today we still have chairs of physics that are called chairs of natural philosophy. I have 
seen biotechnologists, computational linguists and mechanical engineers being awarded the 
degree of doctor of philosophy. But these are anachronisms. The inherited words do not fit the 
reality of the structure of knowledge any more. 
We have evolved – in fits and starts, in coherence and contradictions, in lucidity and darkness - 
we have advanced in complexity.  
From the earliest times our species strove to understand, stumbling in the dark, naming stones, 
seasons, gods, projecting the known into the unknown. Perhaps the thunder was the voice of an 
angry god.  
Or perhaps, not. The first fragments, the first names known to us in making a great 
breakthrough in knowledge – Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Democritus, Pythagoras, 
Parmenides, Zeno – no longer projected the properties of the natural world into a supernatural 
world, but sought to explain the natural world in terms of forces within the natural world. They 
were scientists. They were philosophers. 
In the classical period of ancient Greece, the great questions of the history of philosophy, still 
relevant, but rarely articulated today – were pondered: materialism v idealism, monism v 
pluralism, universality v relativity. The answers to these framed the development of science. 
As we evolved, a division of labour – in knowledge as in much else – was necessary to advance. 
Aristotle, distinguished ancient scientist and philosopher – did distinguish between physics and 
metaphysics, but they were in continuity with one another. They were interdependent. They 
were mutually constituting. 
In the medieval world, all knowledge was subordinated to theology. There was a prolonged 
struggle to liberate both science and philosophy from its rule.  
Even within the constraints, there was some contestation, often with severe consequences. This 
made it very difficult for knowledge to advance.  
Peter Abelard, for one, defended secular knowledge, argued passionately for argument to be 
based on evidence, on reasoning and not on authority. 
During the period of the rise of universities, there was much dispute on faith v reason, on 
revelation v experimentation, preparing the way for the scientific revolution of the modern era. 
To make the transition from the medieval to the modern world, it was necessary to break 
through at the level of epistemology, to establish the hegemony of experiment and reasoning 
over faith and authority.  
 
The trial of Galileo was a point of high drama in what was a prolonged struggle, a struggle that 
is not over, even today. Philosophy was essential to the liberation of science from the forces 
constraining it.   
The epistemologies of the modern era, rationalism and empiricism, contrasting as they were, 
was nevertheless both grounded in individual consciousness and its capacity for discovery. 
Philosophy was a central part of the struggle to make the world safe for science and for 
commerce. There were a number of forces in motion: from the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie 
v feudal power in all its forms to the invention of new technologies of discovery, but philosophy 
was essential in making the case at the level of world view, at the level of epistemological 
criteria, at the level of alternative ethos. 
The enlightenment continued in this trajectory, making the arguments all the more explicit. 
However, there was a counter-action in the romanticist reaction against the enlightenment. This 
tension is with us still in many new age fads and in a rash of pseudo-science, occupying the 
shelves of bookshops where philosophy used to be. 
For the past few centuries there has been greater complexity of competing forces in motion, 
particularly at the level of world view. The advance of science has been a powerful force in 
shaping contemporary consciousness. The impact of evolutionary ideas has been revolutionary, 
most so in identifying natural origins of natural species, in seeing all that exists as in process.  
Again philosophy was crucial to the articulation of implications of these advances. More 
naturalistic, processive philosophies entered the arena.  
Marxism most dramatically emerged into this milieu. I have written a big book on what 
marxism represents in terms of the interaction between philosophy, science and politics.* 
Marxism as a philosophy of science is materialist in the sense of explaining the natural world in 
terms of natural forces and not supernatural powers. It is dialectical  in the sense of being 
evolutionary, processive, developmental. It is radically contextual and relational in the sense of 
seeing everything that exists within the web of forces in which it is embedded. It is empiricist 
without being positivist or reductionist. It is rationalist without being idealist. It is coherent and 
comprehensive while being empirically grounded.  
Other philosophies too were concerned with securing the place of science in the world: 
positivism in particular. It was motivated by the desire to purify knowledge, to clear out the slag 
of superstition accumulated over centuries and to set out uncontestable demarcation criteria for  
deciding what was a legitimate claim to knowledge and what was not. 
After this came many modifications in various forms of neo-positivism until the total reversal 
that was post-positivism. Along this trajectory is where most philosophy of science is today. 
Also along this spectrum we finf the default philosophy of science of many scientists. 
However, philosophy of science has become ever more specialised and esoteric and more 
remote from actual science. Philosophers on the whole have retreated into the subdivisions of 
their own discipline, sometimes becoming more technical, sometimes becoming more fuzzy, but 
always becoming more insular, publishing in journals that no one else ever reads. 
Meanwhile, scientists proceed to do science, mostly with very little in the way of philosophical 
reflection on its methods, implications or consequences.  
Experiments proceed and the empirical data accumulates, but who knows how it all adds up, 
what it all means, what the overall shape of it is ?  
The separate sciences are in the grip of an escalating specialisation that makes it almost 
impossible for scientists to understand what is being said by other scientists within the 
subdivisions of their own discipline, let alone by scientists in other disciplines.  
Gone are the days of the scientist who knew all of science or even of the physicist who knew all 
of physics.  
The education of scientists has become ever more narrow. Suggestions about including history, 
philosophy, sociology, political economy of science are met with the response that the 
curriculum is too full already and that there is no time for it. 
Why should scientists need philosophy? First of all, they need philosophy for the same reason as 
anyone needs philosophy. For a person to mature intellectually, they need to question their 
received world view, to look around at the alternative world views offered by others, to come to 
their own conclusions about their basic beliefs. Do they believe that a supreme being, a god, 
created the world or do they believe that matter evolved into higher and higher forms? Can 
history be reconstructed as a coherent story or it is an irreducibly plural play of fortuitous 
circumstance? 
Within the framework we construct by arriving at our own answers, we live our lives, organise 
our work and scientists pursue science. 
Because many scientists do not do this very deliberately and rigourously, they tend to be 
somewhat schizoid. They are rigourous in the laboratory but all over the place, even credulous, 
in the rest of their lives. They may be positivist in conducting experiments and reporting results, 
but conventional catholics who believe that bread is transformed into the body of a dead but 
living god and dress their daughters as little brides when they consume this bread-body for this 
first time.  
Is there anything wrong with that picture? It is common enough to seem normal. What is such a 
person’s world view? What are their criteria for deciding what to believe? It is one basis for 
science and another for life. To me, it makes no sense. 
There is a need for epistemological criteria to live a consistent and meaningful life and to pursue 
science. Scientists may or may not be doing useful science in a very specific way, but  they are 
undermining science in another way.  
There is widespread distrust of science. There is confusion about its cognitive status. There is 
suspicion of its veracity and morality with the increasing commercialisation of science. 
We live at a time of epistemological crisis. The air is full of contending claims – and not only 
contending claims – but conflicting criteria about how to sort out these contending claims. How 
to sort it all out? How to decide what to believe? This requires philosophical thinking. 
Look at the intellectual landscape of our time. It is full of all sorts of sense and nonsense. Look at 
the many manifestations of nonsense where sense should be. Look at the articulations of science 
in our culture: from the minutiae of molecules to the tao of physics. Did you see the film “What 
the bleep do we know?” Science itself is invoked to justify mysticism and obscurantism.  
Quantum physics – in hopelessly garbled interpretations - is used to justify just about 
everything that anyone wants justified. Ludicrous misinterpretations of Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle abound. Where are the scientists – in this case especially the physicists – 
entering into polemic about this? In the 1930s, eminent scientists, mostly marxists such as 
Bernal, Haldane, Needham, took on the ideas of Jeans and Eddington and others who were 
importing irrationality into science itself and undermining the role of science in interpreting the 
world within the wider culture. 
There is a particular need in our time to address the questions of what is science, what is 
pseudo-science and what is anti-science – what are our criteria for drawing a line between what 
is a legitimate claim to knowledge and what is not. 
Moving from the epistemological to the ontological dimension, what picture of the world, of 
ourselves, is emerging from the advance of science along so many empirical fronts? Who sees 
the whole?  
There is a fracturing of consciousness that is intensifying all the time. 
There may have been some need to for an intellectual division of labour and for resulting 
specialisation for us to advance, but the escalating separatism of the sciences and other 
disciplines needs to be transcended for us to advance further.  
Nature does not respect our academic division of labour. There are problems that simply cannot 
be solved within the boundaries of one science. The progress even of the separate sciences is 
constricted by their separation from other sciences.  
How can this state of affairs be overcome and by whom? The way forward, I believe, must be 
forged empirically, by scientists as scientists. However, to do so, they must have an adequate 
and appropriate philosophy. Here the philosophers have a part to play, but only as part of a 
common enterprise in which scientists must become far more philosophical and philosophers 
must come to know far more about science.  
Not any philosophy will do. Certain philosophical assumptions will block the view and obstruct 
the path. Others will illuminate the way and move the journey onwards.  
There is an optimal philosophy for science, I believe. It is an evolutionary, integrative, 
emergentist form of materialism.  
It is a philosophy which is oriented to explaining the world in terms of the world itself, without 
unwarranted appeals to forces outside the world to explain the world. It considers empirical 
evidence and logical reasoning to be necessary to justify any belief. It takes account of the role of 
time and developmental process in constituting the world and ourselves as what we are and 
what we may yet be. It does not succumb to the temptation to think there can be any adequate 
explanation of a thing without a full realisation of its historicity.  
It looks to the interrelatedness of things as essential to comprehending what they are and 
therefore seeks to put an end to the impoverishment of every discipline through its 
disconnectedness with other disciplines. It recognises the ascending levels of complexity in the 
organisation of matter and the emergence of novelty in the evolutionary process, such that each 
level is rooted in the preceding level without being reducible to it.  
It is not a retreat to an undifferentiated unity, recognising always that specialisation has been 
necessary to the development of the sciences, but that overspecialisation must be transcended in 
a higher synthesis that gives full scope to both the relatedness and distinctness of the specific 
areas.  
What this means, to take the example of psychology, is that psychology is distorted in so far as it 
is disconnected form the social sciences on the one hand and from the biological sciences on the 
other. There are certain crucial things about the human personality that cannot be understood 
without due reference to the social-cultural-economic context which decisively shapes its 
character or without adequate realisation of the neuro-physiological basis of behaviour. 
However, whereas psychologism will not do, neither will sociologism or economism on the one 
hand nor biologism or physicalism on the other.  
Each of the sciences needs to open out to the others and be revitalised and reconstructed in the 
interaction with the goal of integration of knowledge in view.  One thing that is essential to the 
process is an integrative philosophy capable of encompassing all the sciences, all realms of 
knowledge, while giving each its due.  
Will this happen? Unfortunately, I think not. There are and might be more enclaves of it, but it 
will not happen on the scale it should. It runs counter to the most powerful forces in the field – 
the imperatives of the global system itself with its agenda of intensifying commodification of 
knowledge and commercialisation of science, requiring ever greater specificity of outcomes 
without criticism, reflection or intellectual integration. 
It is a central paradox of our times: never has there been such a totalising systematising force as 
contemporary global capitalism and yet never has there been such inhibition of synthesising 
systemic thinking. The centralising market decentres the psyche. It organises production and 
consumption, but disorganises community. Nevertheless, there is a seeking of truth, a striving 
for justice, that the system can neither satisfy nor suppress. In this I place my hope.  
* Helena Sheehan Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History Humanities, Press 
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